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Introduction
The construction of linear infrastructure such as road, rail, pipelines, electricity corridors, and shipping routes is an important driver of global biodiversity decline (Benítez-López et al. 2010) . With expansion of linear infrastructure across the globe ) new approaches to quantify and address its impact on biodiversity are needed. Environmental impact assessment and impact mitigation comprise core parts of the planning process for infrastructure development in most nations (Macintosh 2010) . In this context there are 3 key ways to reduce the environmental impacts of linear infrastructure projects, collectively referred to as the "mitigation hierarchy" (Kiesecker et al. 2010 ): minimize total area affected, choose routes that avoid the largest impacts, and mitigate residual impacts through biodiversity offsets or wildlife-friendly design of structures. These 3 strategies differ in their potential to reduce biodiversity impacts. An increasing interest in landscape-scale strategic planning means focus is shifting from traditional mitigation measures (Priemus 2007; Gordon et al. 2015) toward options that avoid and minimize the landscape impacts of infrastructure development on biodiversity (Kiesecker et al. 2010) . Avoidance may be an attractive option where biodiversity is spatially localized or highly valued, or where loss is difficult to offset or mitigate (Kiesecker et al. 2010) . In these cases, avoidance can decrease impacts and reduce mitigation and offsetting costs and the risk of projects being derailed or delayed due to social and political opposition (Middle & Middle 2010) . However, reducing impacts by rerouting or limiting development may involve a trade-off between development and biodiversity (e.g., Townley & Associates 2004) . Subsequently, uptake of options for avoiding biodiversity impacts is often limited by political or economic concerns (Priemus 2007 ).
An alternate means to reduce the impact of development is to minimize proliferation of infrastructure by maximizing efficiencies of use, such as through infrastructure sharing, where multiple users enter into shared development or use of linear infrastructure. Infrastructure sharing has been implemented to varying degrees of success in a number of settings. One successful example is the Central Queensland Coal Network, a privately run, government-regulated transport network linking over 50 mines with three ports in eastern Australia (Collier & Ireland 2015) . Infrastructure sharing offers benefits to infrastructure users, including minimizing capital costs. Despite its advantages, uptake can be limited by, for example, transaction costs involved in negotiating and maintaining access agreements, capacity constraints, or a desire to maintain competitive advantage by excluding competitors from access to a region. Government strategies to facilitate sharing of linear infrastructure include setting up or legislating third-party ownership of infrastructure, financing extra capacity, and regulating for shared use.
Recognition of the cumulative impacts of linear infrastructure (Raiter et al. 2014 ) means researchers are now beginning to explore the environmental impacts of large transportation networks, which can be substantial (e.g., Jones et al. 2014) . For example, the impacts of roads and rail linking mines to markets can be as large as or larger than the direct impacts from the associated mines (Majer 2014) . Having one high-capacity route may result in better outcomes for biodiversity. Benefits can include reduced habitat loss or fewer barriers to species dispersal, than having many low-capacity routes as the environmental impacts of linear infrastructure do not scale linearly with capacity (Rhodes et al. 2014) . Although the locations of conservation values are generally fixed, linear infrastructure is usually more flexible, presenting opportunities for better biodiversity outcomes within a strategic, landscape-scale planning framework (Kiesecker et al. 2010) . Through processes such the development of private-private collaborations between infrastructure users, infrastructure sharing has the potential to limit the amount of linear infrastructure and minimize its cumulative impacts. The potential environmental benefits arising from collaboration among private actors has received little attention in the conservation literature, despite the potential for this to minimize the cumulative impacts of development (Porter et al. 2013) and mobilize large amounts of capital (Armsworth et al. 2010) .
We explored whether infrastructure sharing under collaborative intraindustry partnerships has the potential to reduce biodiversity impacts (a public benefit, i.e. those benefits flowing to people or communities) and provide cost savings to industry (a private benefit, i.e. those benefits flowing to individuals or companies directly involved in a transaction). We demonstrate this approach with a case study in South Australia, where a number of mines and new ports are proposed and plans are underway to develop linear infrastructure to support the expansion of the mining industry (GoSA 2014). We sought to determine the potential for infrastructure sharing to improve biodiversity outcomes from a set of potential development scenarios that span a range of realistic scenarios. Although proposed development projects should be evaluated in light of multiple criteria (e.g., economic, social, and environmental) (Mandle et al. 2016) , we focused on construction costs and biodiversity impacts. We then considered discussions in the literature on barriers to infrastructure sharing by mining companies and the potential implications for efforts to facilitate collaboration in light of these barriers.
Methods
We explored the biodiversity impacts and the construction costs of infrastructure networks designed to deliver mining commodities to markets (in our case ports) ( Fig. 1 ) under three development scenarios: (1) each mining company develops infrastructure linking its mines to markets independently of other mines in the area (independent scenario); (2) the 5 largest mining companies restrict access to shared infrastructure (restricted-access shared scenario); and (3) where spatially feasible, all mining companies collaborate to build shared infrastructure networks (shared scenario). We compared the difference in costs and impacts on biodiversity in these scenarios to illustrate the relative benefits of pursuing shared infrastructure development compared with the outcomes when infrastructure sharing does not occur. To explore whether this comparison changes under different configurations, we ran a sensitivity analysis with variants on scenarios 1 and 3 that explored the biodiversity outcomes if the mines run by the mining companies whose associated linear infrastructure has the greatest impact were not developed (lowimpact independent and low-impact shared; Supporting Information). We ignored the localized impact of mine and port development on biodiversity, which would be identical in all 3 scenarios, because our focus was on the associated linear infrastructure and its impacts.
Study Region
The study region encompassed the Upper Spencer Gulf and associated regions of South Australia, from the lower Eyre and Yorke Peninsulas into the South Australian Arid Lands (approximately 900 × 1,200 km). The region is home to numerous threatened and iconic species, including Malleefowl (Leipoa ocellata) and kowari (Dasyuroides byrnie), and threatened ecosystems such as Eyre Peninsula Blue Gum (Eucalyptus petiolaris) Woodland. Many endemic and threatened species and ecosystems in the region occur near coastal areas (Fig. 1a) coincident with the highest levels of human modification. This region has been identified as a priority for landscape-scale planning under the Australian Government Sustainable Regional Development Program (https://www.environment.gov.au/sustainability/ sustainable-regional-development) due to the coincidence of a large number of species and ecosystems of national environmental significance, high human population growth, and development plans for industry, urban expansion, and agriculture. Rich ore deposits occur in the region, and a five-fold increase in the volume of mineral exports is expected in the next 20 years (GoSA 2014). To accommodate development and facilitate mining growth in the region, significant investment in upgrading and expanding linear infrastructure linking mines to export markets is currently underway (GoSA 2014).
Scenarios
We calculated biodiversity impacts and capital costs for potential mine-port links to 47 mine locations operated by 28 separate companies. Each of the 28 mining companies operates 1-5 separate mines (https://www. environment.gov.au/sustainability/sustainable-regionaldevelopment; Supporting Information). Three proposed port locations were provided by the Department of Planning, Transport and Infrastructure, South Australia (GoSA 2014). To construct potential infrastructure links, we created a 250-m resolution cost-surface raster of 17.28 million cells in which cells were assigned values representing the cost for infrastructure passing through them. Cost was nonmonetary and was defined by both legislative and environmental suitability of land to host infrastructure (Bagli et al. 2011; Supporting Information) . This included avoiding natural hazards and protected areas and favoring areas adjacent to existing infrastructure corridors because they are zoned for infrastructure expansion in government development plans. We then ran a least cost path analysis on the cost-surface raster to find possible mine-port routes; each mine was a potential start point and the closest port the end point.
We calculated the impacts of each mine-port link for each of our 3 scenarios. For the independent scenario, each of the mining companies developed an independent infrastructure link to the nearest of three ports (Fig. 1b) . A mining company could operate more than one mine, and where the routes overlapped we allocated them a single link to the nearest port. Otherwise, each mine was allocated an independent link to port. Capital costs and biodiversity impacts for each mining company were summed across all infrastructure lines for mines operated by that company.
For the restricted-access scenario, mines associated with the 5 mining companies with the highest economic value were developed first and shared infrastructure, with routing and impact calculation as per the shared scenario (below). Each of the remaining mining companies were excluded from shared infrastructure and developed independent links to the nearest of three ports based on the least cost paths (Fig. 1c ). This resulted in 2 shared lines, with 2 and 3 collaborating partners respectively, and 23 unshared lines. Economic value was approximated from the expected amount of ore from each mine (DMITRE 2014) and 2015 commodity prices (World Bank 2016).
For the shared scenario, mines were linked to 1 of 3 ports via the nearest shared infrastructure corridors (Fig. 1d) . Initially, several shared corridors were identified in consultation with state government officials and based on the Regional Mining Infrastructure Plan (GoSA 2014) to minimize the Euclidean distance of any individual mine from the shared path to port, while still accounting for landscape barriers and attempting to place the shared paths close to existing infrastructure corridors. The corridor with the lowest total summed length (including all tributaries from individual mines and the shared component) was selected.
In each scenario, capital costs and biodiversity impacts (detailed below) were allocated proportionally to each mining company as a function of the length of
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Volume 31, No. 6, 2017 infrastructure from their mine, or mines, to port divided by the number of mining companies sharing each section of infrastructure. For instance, if two companies share 80 km of a 200 km line and were then joined by a third company for an additional 120 km, the first two companies were each allocated (80 × 0.5+120 × 0.33)/20 = 0.4 of the total cost (or impact) and the third company (120 × 0.33)/20 = 0.2 of the total cost (or impact).
Capital Costs
We calculated capital costs incurred by each mining company for infrastructure construction as the sum of construction costs, compensation payments for lost agricultural profitability (i.e., opportunity cost of agricultural profits), and the transaction costs arising from negotiations with the affected landholders for each linear infrastructure route. For simplicity, we ignored operating expenditure and assumed construction costs were fixed irrespective of projected capacity (i.e., the volume of product transported) for each route. We also assumed landholders were compensated only for the loss of land directly affected by infrastructure development (i.e., a 250-m strip along each line).
Construction costs of rail infrastructure were calculated at $4 million/km, based on estimates from the South Australian Regional Mining and Infrastructure Plan (GoSA 2014). We evaluated construction costs for rail only because it is the modality of choice across most of the study region, although a mixed strategy of rail, road, and pipeline may also be feasible in areas of this study region close to ports or where the volume of product is low (GoSA 2014). We ignored water crossings because there are no permanent water flows and the costs of water crossings are difficult to assess without site assessments of hydrology (Deloitte 2013 ) and assumed no additional cost for inclines because the study region is of low profile and predominantly on sandy soil.
Property boundaries were drawn from the 2014 South Australian Digital Cadastral Database (Department of Environment, Water & Natural Resources) and landholdernegotiation costs borne by the mining companies were set at $10,000 per property affected by infrastructure. Current literature provides little guidance on landholdernegotiation costs (transaction costs), and our sensitivity analyses based on alternate transaction costs did not alter the comparative ranking of mines and had minimal impact on overall capital costs (Supporting Information). An estimate of the cost of compensation was drawn from the net present value of lost agricultural productivity from land affected by infrastructure and calculated using agricultural profit at full equity for 2005 -2006 (Marinoni et al. 2012 . We adjusted for inflation to September 2014 (ABS 2014) and determined the net present value of foregone annual agricultural profitability under the assumptions of total loss of agricultural outputs at the infrastructure-impact site and a real discount rate of 5%. Areas with negative profitability were assigned a net present value of zero. Agricultural loss was summed across the area affected by each infrastructure route (Supporting Information). All calculations were in Australian dollars.
Biodiversity Impacts
Biodiversity impact under each scenario was defined as the proportional habitat loss per species summed across 182 biodiversity features of conservation concern found in the study region (175 species and 7 vegetation communities or wetlands listed under national environmental legislation [EPBC 1999 ]; Supporting Information). We used spatial distribution data from Tulloch et al. (2015) to determine the distribution of biodiversity features. As described in Tulloch et al. (2015) , we generated distributions at a resolution of 250 m. Where sufficient species occurrences were available, we used the speciesdistribution modeling software Maxent (73 biodiversity features) to generate habitat-suitability maps. Where sufficient species occurrence data were not available, range maps were generated from polygon and point data (AGDoEE 2014) on the known distribution of 110 biodiversity features.
We summed direct and diffuse loss of habitat to generate the impacts of each infrastructure route on biodiversity features. We assumed the impacts of each infrastructure corridor decrease with increasing distance from the infrastructure and that the rate of the decrease depends on the sensitivity of the species to impacts (Benítez-López et al. 2010) . Taxon-specific responses of biodiversity features to infrastructure were determined by expert elicitation (we assigned species to taxa of birds, ground birds, mammals, plants, reptiles, or frogs) as described in Tulloch et al. (2015) and ranged from direct losses of 100% of all biodiversity features in the zone up to 125 m from infrastructure to diffuse losses ranging from 18% to 96%, depending on distance and taxa in the zones up to 1000 m. For instance, in the 125 to 250 m zone, habitat loss was 77% (plants) to 96% (ground birds). We compared proportional rather than absolute habitat loss to standardize loss across both wide-ranging and rangerestricted species.
Scenario Evaluation
Averted capital cost was the difference between the cost of construction under the restricted or shared scenario and the cost of construction under the independent scenario divided by the total project cost under the independent scenario. Averted biodiversity impact was the absolute difference in biodiversity impact (i.e., proportional habitat loss per biodiversity feature summed across all features) between the independent scenario and each of the
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Volume 31, No. 6, 2017 other 2 scenarios. We made the simplifying assumption that the value of lost habitat is linearly related to the amount of lost habitat. For example 9 species losing 10% of their habitat (a biodiversity impact of 0.9) is equivalent to 1 species losing 90% of its habitat, although the marginal value of habitat may increase as a species becomes rarer.
To assess spatial variation in biodiversity benefits we allocated each mining company to 1 of 5 regional mine-port groups (B1, B2, H1, H2, and M1). Mines that shared a mine-port link under the shared scenario were grouped (see Supporting Information for groupings). We evaluated the benefits across these 5 groups for each of the 3 scenarios.
This work was conducted in ArcGIS version 10.2 (www.esri.com), Python version 2.7.3 (www. python.org), the GDAL package for Python (http://gdal. org/python), and R version 3.1.1 (R Core Team 2014). A glossary of terms is in Supporting Information.
Results

Shared Scenario
Both the private and public benefits from collaborative development and sharing of linear infrastructure were high. The overall capital cost of the shared scenario ($13.0 billion) was less than one-third of the cost of the independent scenario ($36.5 billion); average savings per mining company was $840 million (Table 1 ). The capital costs were heavily influenced by the length of each infrastructure link because construction costs made up the bulk of the capital costs. The total length of infrastructure (3,246 km) under the shared scenario was 36% of that under the independent scenario (9,073 km) ( Table 1) .
The sharing of infrastructure reduced both the total biodiversity impact and the capital cost associated with infrastructure for each individual mining company (Fig. 2) . Relative to the independent scenario, shared infrastructure reduced the total biodiversity impact from 4.78 to 1.12 (measured as a sum of the proportional losses for each feature [see Methods]), a 76% average reduction and a 34-99% reduction for individual mining companies (Table 1 & Fig. 2 ). Results were similar for the low-impact scenarios; sharing reduced biodiversity impact by an average of 65% (range 18-93% per mining company) (Supporting Information). The number of species affected by development dropped from 126 under the independent scenario to 118 under the shared scenario. Of the species affected by development, each species lost an average of 3.75% (SD 5.38) of its habitat under the independent scenario and an average of 0.95% (SD 1.09) of its habitat under the shared scenario (2.62% and 0.61% respectively averaged across all 182 species). The proportional reduction in biodiversity losses from 
Figure 2. Capital infrastructure costs and biodiversity impacts (proportional habitat loss per species summed across all conservation features) of each of 28 mining companies under shared development of mine-port links and independent development. Results of shared (black) and independent (gray) scenarios for the same company are linked by a line.
infrastructure sharing was greater than the reduction in capital costs; there was a 1.2% reduction in impact on species for every 1% reduction in capital cost (Table 1) . Despite overall savings under shared infrastructure, some companies are likely to benefit strongly from reductions in capital costs under infrastructure sharing and others less so. Benefits ranged from 86% to 22% reduction in capital infrastructure costs per mining company (hereafter referred to as averted capital cost) (Fig. 3 & Table 1 ), depending on the distance to the nearest shared infrastructure line, the number of mines sharing each stretch of line, and the length of shared lines.
There was little evidence that reduction in biodiversity impacts (a public benefit) and reduction in capital cost (a private benefit) from infrastructure sharing were strongly related (Fig. 3) (0.003 decrease in biodiversity loss for every 1% reduction in capital costs [intercept 0.380, adjusted r 2 = 0.191, p = 0.012, df = 26], and there was no relationship when the point on the top left of Fig. 3 , which showed high heteroscedasticity, was removed [adjusted r 2 = 0.007, p = 0.286, df = 25]).
Restricted-access Scenario
Under the restricted-access scenario, where larger mining companies excluded smaller companies from shared infrastructure, benefits of infrastructure sharing were modest and spatially localized (Fig. 4) . Total biodiversity impact was reduced only slightly from the independent scenario (4.78 to 4.20) and capital expenditure dropped from $36.5 billion to $33.7 billion (Table 1) .
Relationship Between Corridor Length and Biodiversity Impact
Biodiversity impacts were disproportionately distributed among mining companies; impacts from individual companies ranged from <1% to 15.9% total impact (Table 1) . These losses are related to the length of the infrastructure corridor and variation in this length among mining companies. There was a significant positive relationship between length and biodiversity impact, but lots of variability due to spatial heterogeneity in distribution of conservation features (Fig. 5) (biodiversity impact 0.0460/100 km, intercept set to zero; adjusted r 2 = 0.579, p < 0.0001, df = 31).
Discussion
Reducing the impacts of linear infrastructure on biodiversity is a major challenge for conservation . In many parts of the world, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, large areas of previously intact landscapes are threatened by development of infrastructure projects (Edwards et al. 2014) . Exploring options to reduce biodiversity impacts is a priority both for conservation organizations and for governments in these regions. Our results indicate there can be significant gains from systematic, landscape-scale sharing of linear infrastructure routes. We demonstrated that shared infrastructure delivered better outcomes for biodiversity than independent development of transportation infrastructure and provided potential benefits to infrastructure users. Infrastructure sharing reduced landscape-wide biodiversity impact by 76% and provided a 64% reduction in the total capital cost of infrastructure. Landscape-wide planning schemes, such as the South Australian Regional Mining and Infrastructure Plan (GoSA 2014), could provide a means of critically examining the cumulative impacts of mining development arising from mines, ports, and related linear infrastructure. Support for landscapescale planning should be a priority for conservationists.
The biodiversity impacts attributed to each mining company under the different scenarios varied across the study area (Fig. 4) . Although biodiversity impact increased with length of infrastructure, the variance in the relationship was high (Fig. 5) due to the spatial heterogeneity in biodiversity features and consistent with other findings (Friedrich 2015) . Nonetheless, some small lengths of infrastructure had disproportionally high impacts. For instance, one 46 km length of infrastructure had a biodiversity impact of 0.76% of summed habitat lost/km, vastly exceeding the average loss of 0.05%/km. The disproportionate cost to the public of infrastructure development associated with high-impact corridors (such as from costs associated with threatened species recovery) relative to the public benefits may make development of associated mines an unpalatable option under landscape-wide strategic planning. Excluding the 5 mine-port links responsible for the highest biodiversity losses from development reduced infrastructure-related impacts to biodiversity by 45% and avoided the direct impacts from construction of each of those mines.
Although averting mine impacts by not developing mines may be preferable from a no-impact point of view, this is likely to be met with strong opposition from industry and government, both in our study region and many other areas around the world (Priemus 2007) . Attitudes in the region are very much utilitarian in nature, and recent
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Volume 31, No. 6, 2017 closures of several key industries have left the region economically and politically unstable. Recent political events in Australia indicate that stopping development of even a coal mine of questionable economic viability and documented ecological impacts on both an endangered species and a flagship ecosystem is challenging (Grech et al. 2016 ). In our opinion, when developing models and scenarios such as those presented here, it is important to consider the viewpoints of the range of stakeholders likely to enact the conservation actions being proposed, who may have contrasting value systems and political views. We believe our role as conservation scientists is to propose a range of solutions encompassing those that are pragmatic as well as those that may be idealistic. Our key message is that infrastructure sharing can help avert some of the worst impacts of mining infrastructure.
The relative costs and benefits of infrastructure sharing at a local scale depend on the spatial pattern of both biodiversity and infrastructure. Spatial patterns of resources have been recognized as a factor in decisions about whether or not to invest in shared infrastructure (Toledano et al. 2014; Collier & Ireland 2015) . Our findings show that the reductions in capital cost under infrastructure sharing are high, at least when capacity constraints are ignored (Fig 2) . In some cases, infrastructure sharing returned over 40% reduction in capital cost. Despite this, the greatest reductions in capital cost were often not strongly associated with the greatest reductions in biodiversity impact for individual mining companies under a shared scenario (Fig. 3) . For instance, one company received low benefits from sharing infrastructure. It had a 22% reduction in capital cost compared with an average of 64% (Fig. 3 top left) . This was the result of a large distance between this company's mines and those of its nearest neighbor; thus, there was a high proportional responsibility borne by this mine for capital costs associated with the shared mine-port link. Despite limited private benefits to this isolated company from collaborating with neighboring companies, infrastructure sharing dramatically reduced the biodiversity impacts of this company. Differences in rewards from collaboration have also been found in cross-national conservation initiatives .
Although infrastructure sharing has the potential to deliver strong reductions in biodiversity impact, we found benefits were greatly reduced when only a small subset of the companies shared infrastructure. In the absence of government prevention of anticompetitive behavior, the first mining company into an area will often have strong incentives to block access to infrastructure by competitors (Collier & Ireland 2015) . The companies excluded from shared access must then develop their own infrastructure, increasing impacts on biodiversity. Such a situation will likely occur often in the real world (Collier & Ireland 2015) . For instance, the large mining companies in the Pilbara region of Australia have restricted access of smaller mining companies to their rail networks, citing loss of capacity and flexibility (Koshy & Kenyon 2007) , and circumvented government policy aimed at promoting open access to (or sharing of) infrastructure. Our results indicate that such behavior can undermine the public benefits of infrastructure sharing. Enactment and enforcement of legislation aimed at promoting infrastructure sharing and limiting anticompetitive behavior may therefore be highly beneficial for both conservationists and governments.
Infrastructure developers and users will have private incentives both for and against infrastructure sharing, and these will depend on the size of the company, their access to capital, whether they are new to an area, and landscape features along the proposed routes. Although we considered only the influence of capital costs on infrastructure sharing, there may be additional private incentives for infrastructure sharing. Small, low-profit mining companies that lack the financial capacity to invest in infrastructure are most likely to support or seek opportunities for infrastructure sharing (Toledano et al. 2014) . For instance, small mining companies in the Pilbara region that were historically excluded from access to infrastructure are now exploring options for collaborative development of a rail network (Ker 2012; Collier & Ireland 2015) . Low commodity prices may also promote infrastructure sharing by increasing mining companies' incentives to reduce costs, although this may also increase competitive behavior. More detailed consideration of the influence of these factors would be a worthwhile avenue for future work.
Even with these benefits, and the possible addition of widespread publicly funded policy interventions to encourage private collaboration (e.g., regulating for shared infrastructure or negotiating for a single entity to manage haulage), widespread collaboration may not eventuate. Although our results indicate large decreases in capital costs with infrastructure sharing, these will be offset to some degree by transaction costs in negotiating, maintaining, and enforcing agreements, and possible losses of convenience or capacity for some companies relative to a private line. Mining companies are less likely to share existing infrastructure where independent infrastructure provides them a strategic advantage over competitors, where they have the financial capability to fund their own infrastructure, or where their investment in infrastructure is already high (Toledano et al. 2014; Collier & Ireland 2015) . Furthermore, in cases where partners' projects may be held up by funding constraints or environmental approvals, companies may perceive the uncertainties and risks of collaboration as too high (Levin et al. 2013; Porter et al. 2013) . Decisions on whether to collaborate or not will also be influenced by the costs of adding capacity to existing corridors, or capacity for handling different commodities as well as loss of control over transport schedules and expansion
Volume 31, No. 6, 2017 potential. We ignored these factors in our analysis because they required detailed knowledge of each mining operation, which was outside the scope of our study, but a consideration of these disincentives will be important when designing real-world infrastructure-sharing schemes.
Different parameterization of the deterministic model we used could shift the relative benefits of infrastructure sharing, although we would expect general patterns of reduced impacts under shared scenarios to hold. Although subject to uncertainty, the parameters we used represent the information available to government and infrastructure proponents during early stages of infrastructure planning. The predictions of species distribution are subject to differing amounts of uncertainty, and this uncertainty could shift the relative impacts of infrastructure. Greater understanding of how and whether additional species monitoring would alter the routing or outcomes of infrastructure development is urgently required. We ignored impacts arising from fragmentation of habitat because we expect fragmentation to have a small impact in this study region given the large study area and that the infrastructure fragmentation effects are likely to be primarily local in nature. However, in certain landscapes fragmentation from linear infrastructure can have large impacts on biodiversity (Rhodes et al. 2014) . We sought to assess the potential conservation benefits from shared infrastructure, rather than to develop a detailed infrastructure plan for the study region. As such, we used best currently available information on species distributions and made a number of simplifying assumptions about routing.
We found that infrastructure sharing has the potential to reduce impacts of development on biodiversity while providing potential reductions in the cost of infrastructure development. These benefits were tempered in situations where infrastructure sharing was undertaken only by a few partners or when the dominant mining companies restricted access to infrastructure. Previous work on the public benefits of shared infrastructure suggest it can deliver significantly higher benefits relative to independent development (Toledano et al. 2014; Collier & Ireland 2015) . These include opening up a region to agricultural markets, higher tax revenue or mining revenues, or enabling the development of otherwise stranded assets. Consequently, the public arguments for shared infrastructure may be multiple, although advantages will be tempered by the publicly borne costs of facilitating shared access to infrastructure and loss of natural assets (Pannell 2008; Kiesecker et al. 2010) . By illustrating circumstances under which infrastructure sharing can provide better outcomes for both biodiversity and development, our research opens the way for a more nuanced conversation about the merits of avoiding rather than merely mitigating the impacts of infrastructure on biodiversity and other natural assets.
